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NOTES
FOX v. FOX: REDEFINING THE BEST INTEREST
OF THE CHILD STANDARD FOR LESBIAN
MOTHERS AND THEIR FAMILIES
I. TNTRODUCrION
Custody disputes between parents are often difficult and traumatizing for
both parents and children. However, this already painful process may become
even more difficult and painful if one parent attempts to use the other's sexual
preference as a trump card to win custody of the children. Oscar Wilde ex-
pressed the trauma of being separated from his children while incarcerated
under sodomy charges: "[My two children are taken from me by legal proce-
dure. That is and always will remain to me a source of infinite distress, of
infinite pain .... ."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in the recent case of Fox v. Fox,2 consid-
ered a custody decision in which the mother was a lesbian. This note focuses
1. David S. Dooley, Comment, Immoral Because They're Bad, Bad Because They're Wrong: Sexual
Orientation and Presumptions of Parental Unfitness in Custody Disputes, 26 CAL. W. L. REv. 395, 395
(1990) (citing Robert A. Beargie, Custody Determinations Involving the Homosexual Parent, 22 FAM. L.Q. 71
(1988) (quoting OSCAR WILDE, DE PROFuNDIS 34 (R. Ross ed., 1909))). See also NATIONAL CrR. FOR LEsBI-
AN RIGHTS, LESBIAN MoThER LIIGATION MANUAL 1-2 (2d ed. 1990).
There are at least 1.5 million lesbian mothers living in the United States. Regardless of whether they
have ever been involved in a legal battle to maintain custody of their children, these mothers live
with the constant fear that someone may challenge their right to live with and care for their children.
When that right is, in fact, challenged in court, the lesbian mother and her family confront an intense
emotional trauma as well as a significant legal problem. The threat of terminating or interfering with,
the mother/child relationship can be devastating .... Because of the traditional legal, psychological,
and social sanctions imposed against women, particularly those women engaged in same-sex rela-
tionships, many lesbians still live in absolute fear of being discovered. Such fear is well grounded in
reality-women do continue to lose custody of their children, jobs, housing, and other rights, solely
on the basis of their sexual orientation.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Donna Hitchens, Social Attitudes, Legal Standards and Personal Trauma in
Child Custody Cases, 5 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 89, 93-94 (1979) (discussing the effect fear of custody challenges
has on homosexuals).
Regardless of whether a parent has ever been involved in a court challenge, the threat of losing the
custody of one's children--or being forced to choose between one's lover and a child-is an every-
day reality for homosexual fathers and mothers. Gay parents are aware that their sexual orientation
can all too easily be used against them by ex-spouses, family, or state authorities. Decisions about
how to live, with whom to live, how to raise children, whether to "come out," and whether to be-
come involved in political activities, all have potentially severe legal consequences bearing on the
right to remain a parent.
Id. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Developments in the Law-Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1508 (1989).
2. 904 P.2d 66 (Okla. 1995).
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on the Fox decision as well as the general standards used in custody disputes.
Special attention is given to arguments which many courts use to deny custody
to homosexual parents. This note concludes that the Oklahoma Supreme Court
has made a well-reasoned decision which will be in the best interest of children
of lesbian mothers and their families.
1I. BACKGROUND ON STANDARDS USED IN CUSTODY DISPUTES
The legal standard almost universally applied by courts in child custody
disputes is the "best interest of the child" standard.3 However, without further
interpretation, the standard is very vague, allowing trial courts large amounts of
discretion.4 Thus, courts may apply the best interest of the child standard dif-
ferently in custody cases involving homosexual parents.
Historically, there have been three different standards governing how the
homosexuality of a parent should be applied by courts in making custody deci-
sions. First, the per se standard generally holds that a homosexual parent is
unfit as a matter of law.5 This approach establishes a rebuttable presumption
that being homosexual renders a parent unfit to raise a child.6 The court does
not have to consider any factors concerning the child's best interest, but can
categorically deny custody to a homosexual parent.7
Second, some courts have instead used a presumption of harm or middle
ground approach in determining the fitness of homosexual parents.8 These
courts conclude that declaring a lesbian mother unfit as a matter of law is im-
proper, and that other factors affecting the best interest of the child must be
considered However, even though the parent is not per se considered to be an
3. See Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Liti-
gation Strategy, 25 BuFF. L. REv. 691, 693 (quoting HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 572 (1968)).
4. See id.
5. See LAURA BENKov, REINVENTING THE FAMILY: THE EMERGING STORY OF LESBIAN AND GAY
PARENTS 40 (1994); Hunter & Polikoff, supra note 3, at 695-96 (citing Nadler v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 352 (1967) (reversing thd trial court which decided that the mother's homosexuality rendered her per se
unfit and emphasizing the need to consider all of the factors to determine the best interest of the child)). See
also Donna Hitchens & Barbara Price, Trial Strategy In Lesbian Mother Custody Cases: The Use of Expert
Testimony, 9 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 451, 453-54 (1978-79) (citing Nadler v. Nadler, No, 177331 (Cal.
Super. CL, Sacramento County, Nov. 1967)).
6. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 407 (citing G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. CL App. 1987); T.C.H.
v. K.M.H., 784 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. CL App. 1989)); Robert A. Beargie, Custody Determinations Involving the
Homosexual Parent, 22 FAM. L.Q. 71 (1988)). See generally BENKoV, supra note 5, at 40-46.
7. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 395-96, 407.
8. See BENKOv, supra note 5, at 44.
9. See id.; see also NATIONAL CrR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 12-14.
The following are factors commonly considered relevant to the determination of the best interest
of the child: ...
1. The physical home environment that can be provided by each party, including the avail-
ability of separate bedrooms for each child and parent's own bedroom;
2. The geographical location of the home, the kind of neighborhood, and its proximity to
schools, and recreational facilities;
3. The composition of the family unit, such as other adults and children living in the home;
4. The moral standards of the parties;
5. The age, gender, and health of the parties as compared to each other and the children;
6. The financial status of the parties;
2
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unfit parent, the court presumes that the child will suffer because of the social
stigma attached to the parent's homosexuality."0 This approach condemns the
homosexual conduct but not the homosexual person." Consequently, the court
will often forbid the child to have contact with the parent's homosexual life-
style. 2 Moreover, the presumption of harm or the middle ground standard is
often used to find homosexuality detrimental to the child without clearly sup-
porting evidence. 3
Finally, the nexus standard 4 resolves many of the problems and detrimen-
tal effects of the per se and presumption of harm standard. The nexus standard
takes a parent's sexual preference into consideration as only one of many fac-
tors." Homosexuality will only be held against the parent if there is a nexus
between the parent's sexual preference and possible harmful effects on the
child. 6 Accordingly, courts using this standard require a showing that the ho-
mosexuality of a parent has an adverse effect on the child.'7 The nexus stan-
dard does not consider homosexuality by itself or the homosexual behavior as a
valid consideration for denying custody; it only considers the parent's sexual
orientation when it has an adverse effect on the child's best interest."
I. Fox v. Fox19
A. Facts
Donna Jeanne Fox and Larry James Fox were divorced in August 1988.0
Donna was awarded custody of their two children, and Larry was awarded rea-
sonable visitation rights.2 ' In May of 1989, Larry requested but was denied
7. The child's preference, if the child is of sufficient age to formulate a mature preference;
and
8. The emotional bonds that exist between the child and each of the parents.
In lesbian mother custody cases there have been several additional factors that have commonly
been considered by the court. For example:
1. Whether the lesbian mother lives with a partner;,
2. Whether the lesbian mother is active in lesbian and gay rights endeavors and will expose
the children to such activity; and
3. Whether there are "appropriate" male role models available to the children.
Id.
10. See generally BENKOV, supra note 5, at 63-67.
11. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 409.
12. See id. at 396.
13. See BENKOV, supra note 5, at 44. But see Hunter & Polikoff, supra note 3, at 694-95 (citing Stack v.
Stack, 11 Cal. Rptr. 177, 187 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961)) (recognizing that a judge should not decide on the
basis of his on morals and values but solely on the best interest of the child); see also Gorham v. Gorham,
692 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Okla. 1984) (same).
14. Also referred to as the detriment standard. See BENKOv, supra note 5, at 45.
15. See id. at 45.
16. See id.; Dooley, supra note 1, at 396.
17. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 411 (citing Robert A. Beargie, Custody Determinations Involving the
Homosexual Parent, 22 FAM. L.Q. 71, 74 (1988)).
18. See id. at 411 (citing S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985)).
19. 904 P.2d 66 (Okla. 1995).
20. See id. at 68.
21. See id.
3
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joint custody.' In February of 1992, he applied for a change in custody on the
grounds that Donna's homosexuality was contrary to the children's moral and
religious values and harmful to their psychological and emotional stability.'
The trial court heard the motion to modify custody in a two-day hear-
ing.24 Numerous witnesses were called," including expert witnesses.26 The
children's school records and psychological reports were presented. 7 Appar-
ently, Larry and Donna also disagreed on disciplinary matters and an intended
move by Donna and her lesbian lover, Joani.' After the hearing, the trial court
awarded custody of the children to Larry, finding a substantial change in condi-




25. See id. Donna-Maria Naila Williams, a friend of Donna Fox for over two years, testified that les-
bianism is not looked upon well by her religion, Catholicism, but that nonetheless she sees Donna as a good
mother and the children seemed happy and well-cared for. See Brief-in-Chief of Appellant at 7, Fox (No.
79,676). Witness Patricia Lynn-Meyers, Donna's boss at the University of Oklahoma library and a social
friend, testified that Donna is a good mother and one of the few persons she allows to baby-sit her own chil-
dren. See id. She observed that the children seemed happy since Joani moved in. See id. Joani Bedoe,
Donna's companion, testified that she had a loving relationship with the children. See id. She also stated that
she and Donna had discussed a total commitment to a lifetime relationship and they felt that a monogamous
relationship would not harm the children. See id.
26. See Fox, 904 P.2d at 68. Dr. Gwen Garner, a clinical psychologist, evaluated the children for their
current level of cognitive, social, and emotional functioning. See Brief-in-Chief of Appellant at 11, Fox (No.
79,676). She testified that the children were well adjusted and functioned at normal or above average levels.
See id. Dr. William Sill, who has doctoral degrees in biology and geology and is a member of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints Institute for Religious Studies, is authorized to teach the doctrines of the
church. See id. at 8. He testified that, under the church's view, the family was the central unit, both spiritually
and physically, and that it viewed homosexuality in the same light as adultery because it destroys or prevents
the formation of a normal marriage relationship. See Appellee's Answer Brief, Appendix at VI, Fox (No.
79,676). However, he did not know any of the persons involved in the case. See Brief-in-Chief of Appellant
at 8, Fox (No. 79,676). Dr. John Call, a psychologist specializing in clinical and forensic psychology testified
that being a lesbian does not render a mother per se unfit. See Appellee's Answer Brief, Appendix at Inl, Fox
(No. 79,676). He warned about societal prejudices and the conflict between the children's Mormon religion
and a lesbian relationship's effect on the children. See id. at lII-IV. He did state, however, that he had no
actual opinion about the psychological make-up or the parenting skills of any of the parties. See Brief-in-
Chief of Appellant at 9, Fox (No. 79,676).
27. See Fox, 904 P.2d at 68.
28. See Brief-in-Chief of Appellant at 2-15, Fox (No. 79,676). In October of 1991, Donna started living
with her lesbian lover Joani. See id. at 2. Larry Fox, at the time, did not raise any objections to Donna's fit-
ness as a parent. See id. Much of the controversy seems to be triggered by Donna and Joani's announcement
that they planned a move to Alaska and wanted to work out visitation rights with Larry. See id.
Larry Fox remarried and purchased a new home. See id. While he was working, his new wife Martha
was at home running a day care and was available to supervise the children. See Appellee's Answer Brief,
Appendix at I, Fox (No. 79,676). He emphasized that he would be able to provide a traditional family atmo-
sphere for the girls. See id. The main dispute between Donna and Larry was regarding some of disciplinary
aspects of the girls' education. See id. at 11. Larry complained that the girls were not always properly dressed
and that they were afraid of monsters because they were allowed by their mother to watch late night televi-
sion. See id.
However, even Larry testified that he was unaware the children were experiencing harm in the home
of the mother other than the fact of her lesbianism. See Fox, 904 P.2d at 69. He was unaware of any harm to
the children in their peer relationships, in their school work, in their community relationships, or in their
family relationships, and they suffered no physical evidence of harm. See id. He also saw Donna and himself
acting as fit and proper persons who would show love, concern and care for their children. See Reply Brief of
Appellant at 10, Fox (No. 79,676). On the other hand, Donna alleged that the father was often too busy to
spend time with the girls and used a rigid system of discipline including spanking and checkmarks for bad
behavior. See Appellee's Answer Brief, Appendix at X, Fox (No. 79,676).
29. See id. at 68-69.
4
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B. Issue Presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court
Does a mother's lesbianism alone provide sufficient support to modify a
permanent child custody order to the benefit of the noncustodial father?
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BURDEN OF PROOF
Oklahoma, along with most other states, applies the best interest of the
child standard to determine custody as required by law." However, appellate
courts generally defer to trial courts' findings of fact as to what is in the best
interest of the child,31 and the standard of review generally used by courts is
whether the trial court abused its discretion. 2 Oklahoma similarly requires that
the trial court's decision must be clearly erroneous to be overruled on appeal. 3
Moreover, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in David v. David34 placed the bur-
den of proof for modification of child custody on the applicant to show a sub-
stantial change in circumstances which directly affects the best interest of the
child." Therefore, in Oklahoma, a reversal of the trial court's determination of
what is in a child's best interest is often difficult to obtain.
V. THE LAW PRIOR TO Fox
M.J.P. v. J.G.P.6 was a case of first impression in Oklahoma.37 The case
involved a homosexual mother who was initially awarded custody." The Okla-
homa Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to modify the initial
custody decision, granting custody to the father.39 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court in MJ.P supported modification of custody with the best interest of the
child standard laid out in Gibbons v. Gibbons:'4
[A] permanent, material and substantial change of circumstances or condi-
tions of the parties, directly affecting the welfare of the child to a substan-
tial or material degree, and as a result of which it would appear that the
child would be substantially better off, with respect to its temporal welfare
and its mental and moral welfare, if the requested change in custody were
ordered by the court.'
30. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 112 (1991 & Supp. 1994). Almost every state in the union has adopted
the best interest of the child standard. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1630.
31. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1630.1
32. See id.
33. See Fox, 904 P.2d at 69.
34. 460 P.2d 116 (Okla. 1968).
35. See idat 117.
36. 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982).
37. See id. at 967.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 969.
40. 442 P.2d 482 (Okla. 1968).
41. MJ.P., 640 P.2d at 967 (citing Gibbons, 442 P.2d at 485).
1996]
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However, in determining the best interest of the child, the court in M.J.P. fo-
cused extensively on the possible future harm to children which could be
caused by the mother's homosexuality. 2 Although the court stated that the
change of custody should be sustained based on the all of the "above mentioned
evidence,"'43 it is difficult not to draw the conclusion that possible future harm
stemming from the mother's sexual preference was the determining factor in the
court's decision.
In Gorham v. Gorham,' the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the best in-
terest of the child preeminent once more.' This case involved a mother who
had gone through "several relationships."' The court took into consideration
the mother's discretion to shield the child from her lifestyle.47 The court em-
phasized that the determinative factor in deciding child custody is a nexus be-
tween behavior that is detrimental to the best interest of the child and the effect
of the behavior on the child.' Thus, a trial court may consider a parent's dis-
cretion as only one factor regarding the effect of the parent's behavior on the
child. Most importantly, in denying a change of custody, the court in Gorham
held that a court should not enter legal judgments based on its own conception
of morality and emphasized the necessity to show a direct and adverse effect on
the best interest of the child in order to modify custody.49
Other jurisdictions considering the issue under the best interest of the child
standard have not awarded custody to a lesbian mother. For example, one of the
most recent and controversial cases concerning the issue of lesbian mothers and
child custody is the case of Bottoms v. Bottoms." There, the court refused cus-
tody to the natural mother, Sharon Lynne Bottoms, and awarded custody to the
grandmother, Pamela Kay Bottoms, contrary to the presumption in favor of the
natural mother.5 In considering the best interest of the child and what makes a
parent unfit, the Bottoms court looked at the following factors: (1) the parent's
misconduct that affects the child, (2) the parent's neglect of the child, (3) the
parent's unwillingness or inability to care for the physical and emotional well-
being of the child, (4) and the nature of the home environment and the moral
climate. 2 The court did not hold that a lesbian mother is per se unfit but rec-
ognized that conduct inherent in lesbianism is a felony in Virginia. 3 The court
reiterated the social condemnation argument that the child will be affected by
42. See id at 969.
43. See id.
44. 692 P.2d 1375 (Okla. 1984).
45. See id. at 1378.
46. See id. at 1378-79.
47. See id. at 1379.
48. See id. at 1378.
49. See id.
50. 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995).
51. See id. at 108.
52. See id. at 107. See also, NATIONAL CrR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 12-14 (listing factors
considered by courts in custody cases and additional factors considered in lesbian mother custody cases).
53. See Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 108.
[Vol. 32:57
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the stigma of active lesbianism 4 However, the Bottoms court did focus on
other elements to determine custody and not solely on the lesbianism issue.5
Apparently, Sharon Lynne Bottoms, the defendant and natural mother, was not
deemed a proper caretaker of the child by the court. According to the court, she
repeatedly neglected the child's needs, was physically abusive to the child and
was unable to hold a job. 6 Thus, there were sufficient factors weighing against
Sharon Bottoms to justify a change of custody without focusing on her lesbian
relationship.
The dissenting opinion in Bottoms disagreed with the trial court's per se
finding of parental unfitness because of the mother's homosexuality57 Analo-
gous to Gorham, the dissent's argument was that the majority opinion should
not have based its decision on its own perceptions of morality when there is no
evidence that the homosexual orientation of the parent hurts the child. The
dissent asserted that the trial court and the majority opinion erroneously at-
tached importance to factors that have no actual or real effect on the child.59
The United States Supreme Court also discussed the possibility of future
trauma and social stigma to children resulting from community disapproval of a
parent's personal relationships in Palmore v. Sidoti. ° The Palmore case dealt
with the legal effect on the custody of a child when a European American
mother remarried an African American man.6 Unlike the court in MJ.P., the
Palmore Court disagreed with the reasoning that allows a change of custody
based on possible future harm to the children caused by private biases.62 The
Court, therefore, reversed a child custody ruling which considered such a fac-
tor. 3 The court expressly held that "the Constitution cannot control such preju-
dices but neither can it tolerate them. Private biases may be outside the reach of
the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect."'
VI. THE DECISION IN Fox
After a two-day hearing, the trial court in Fox decided to modify custo-
dy. 5 The District Court of Cleveland County held that the mother was unfit as
a parent.' The court also held, as its basis for custody modification, that there
was a material change in conditions. 7 The Oklahoma Court of Appeals af-
54. See id.
55. See id. at 106.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 109.
58. See id; Gorham v. Gorham, 692 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Okla. 1984).
59. See Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 109.
60. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
61. See id. at 430.
62. See id. at 433-34.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 433.
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firmed, finding not that the mother was unfit, but relied instead on the authority
of MJ.P. v. J.G.P.68
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed both the trial court and the appel-
late court decisions to modify custody in favor of the father.69 The court spe-
cifically used the nexus standard and found the evidence insufficient to establish
that the best interest of the children was directly and adversely affected by a
significant change of circumstances of the custodial environment provided by
the appellant mother.7" The court further held that the trial court's order chang-
ing the custody from appellant mother to the appellee father was an abuse of
discretion." The court relied on three factors to find that there was no relevant
evidence of mother's unfitness. First, the court strictly followed the best interest
of child standard7 Second, there was no showing of a significant change of
circumstances that adversely affected the best interest of the child." Third,
there was no evidence to support a finding that the temporal, moral, and mental
welfare of the child would be improved if custody was changed.74
VII. ANALYSIS
A. Focusing On the Best Interest of the Child
Using a parent's sexual preference as the controlling factor to deny custody
rights violates the Oklahoma statutory requirement of basing custody decisions
on the best interest of the child.' In Fox, the Oklahoma Supreme Court, as it
had done in prior decisions,' 6 emphasized the three Gibbons factors for modifi-
cation of child custody. 7 The three factors are clear indicators of the nexus
standard which Fox holds applicable in child custody cases relating to issues of
lesbianism and its effect on child custody.78 Thus, in cases involving a homo-
sexual parent, the determining factor for custody decisions is the effect of the
parent's homosexual relationship on the child. Custody modification is allowed
only if the parent's homosexual relationship is found to be detrimental to the
child's well being or is found to be an impairment to the child's emotional or
physical health.79 Thus, the Oklahoma Supreme Court set a clear precedent
68. See id. at 70 (citing MJ.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982)).
69. See id.
70. See id. at 69.
71. See id. at 67-68.
72. See id. at 69 (citing Gibbons v. Gibbons, 442 P.2d 482 (Okla. 1968)).
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 112 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
76. See Gorham v. Gorham, 692 P.2d 1375 (Okla. 1984); MJ.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966 (Okla. 1982);
David v. David, 460 P.2d 116 (Okla. 1969); Gibbons v. Gibbons, 442 P.2d 482 (Okla. 1968).
77. See Fox, 904 P.2d at 69 (citing Gibbons, 442 P.2d at 485). See also supra notes 40-41 and accom-
panying text (discussing the Gibbons factors).
78. See id.
79. See id. at 68-69.
(Vol. 32:57
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that, for all future decisions in custody cases, Oklahoma courts must apply the
nexus standard."
The Fox court also rejected the reasoning applied in the Bottoms case: a
court cannot use its conception that homosexuality is wrong as a reason for
denying custody to the natural mother." Fox follows the reasoning in Gorham
by holding that a court should not enter legal judgments based on its own indi-
vidualized conceptions of morality; instead, it is necessary to show a direct and
adverse effect on the best interest of the child.n Furthermore, possible future
psychological harm to children, including that caused by the parent's homosex-
uality, should not be considered by courts in making custody determinations, as
held in Miracle v. Miracle.83
[W]e must not necessarily consider what the facts and circumstances of
the parents might be eight or ten years from now or even five years from
now, as any consideration would have to be predicated on conjecture, but
what would be for the best interest of the child presently and in the im-
mediate future. 4
B. Factors Affecting the Psychological Well-Being of the Child
Widespread perceptions based on Judeo-Christian dogma that homosexuali-
ty is wrong, bad, and sinful lead to society's view of homosexuality as a sick-
ness. Moreover, since such views are codified by sodomy statutes, courts may
feel justified in viewing homosexuality as detrimental to the child's best interest
per se. 5 When homosexuality is seen as a crime, a mortal sin, or a sickness,
courts may impose their own views on the issue.86 When judgment is colored
by courts' perception of proper moral behavior, courts may lose sight of the
child's best interest.
However, as established in Gibbons, the child's temporal, moral and men-
tal welfare must be improved by a change in custody in order to justify modifi-
cation to the noncustodial parent.8 7 Although courts are clearly trying to evalu-
ate the psychological effects of the custody situation on the child, it seems
difficult, even for judges, to distinguish between their own concepts of morality
and objective psychological factors that harm or benefit a child. The nexus
standard does not focus on anyone's morality; instead, it focuses on the best
interest of the child."8
80. See id. at 69.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. 360 P.2d 712 (Okla. 1961).
84. Id. at 715. See also supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text (discussing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429 (1984)).
85. See generally BENIov, supra note 5, ch. 3 (discussing in more detail the relationship between homo-
sexuality and religion, homosexuality and psychiatry, and homosexuality and criminality).
86. See id. at 41.
87. See Gibbons v. Gibbons, 442 P.2d 482, 482-83 (Okla. 1968).
88. See Fox v. Fox, 904 P.2d 66, 69 (Okla. 1995); Gorham v. Gorham, 692 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Okla.
1984); BENKov, supra note 5, at 45.
1996]
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As explored below, a number of myths about homosexuality exist." There
are well over 1.5 million lesbian mothers in this country who could potentially
be affected by the impact of these myths.' A topic that consumes much trial
time in lesbian mother custody cases is the possible effects of these myths on
the children of a lesbian mother."' However, these myths should not enter into
the nexus equation in considering what is in the best interest of the child.
1. Negative Effects on the Moral Development of the Child
Courts often presume that the homosexuality of the parent will negatively
affect the moral development of the child.' Thus, it may be inferred that some
courts consider homosexuality in itself immoral." For example, in a 1989 cus-
tody case, a Missouri appellate court stated:
Private personal conduct by a parent which could well have an effect on
children during years in which their character, morality, virtues and values
are being formed cannot be ignored or sanctioned by courts. Private con-
duct of a parent in the presence of a child or even under some other cir-
cumstances may well influence his or her young, impressionable life ....
No matter how [the gay parent] or society views the private morality of
the situation, we cannot ignore the influence [the gay parent's] conduct
may well have upon the future of this chid [sic] and cannot give our judi-
cial cachet to such conduct by etching in the law-books for all to read and
follow. We see no salutary effect for the young child by exposing him to
the [gay parent's] miasmatic moral standards.94
Similarly, in Collins v. Collins, a Tennessee appellate court expressed its opin-
ion on the subject: "Homosexuality has been considered contrary to the morality
of man for well over two thousand years. It has been and is considered to be an
unnatural, immoral act."'95
This kind of reasoning is contrary to Gorham, which speaks strictly against
the sole use of a judge's conception of morality and mandates consideration
only of what is in the best interest of the child.96 The nexus of the best interest
of the child and the relative effects of the parent's behavior cannot justly be
applied when judges' conceptions of morality enter into the picture. The Okla-
homa Supreme Court in Fox, by citing Gorham, appears to agree with the rea-
soning of the nexus standardY The Fox court seems to reject decisions based
89. See generally BENKov, supra note 5, at 57-68; Dooley, supra note 1, at 414-23; Hitchens & Price,
supra note 5, at 452-61; Hunter & Polikoff, supra note 3, at 723-24; Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1637-40.
90. See Hunter & Polikoff, supra note 3, at 691. It has been estimated that between 13 and 20 percent of
all lesbians are mothers. See id. at 691 n.l.
91. See Hitchens & Price, supra note 5, at 455.
92. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 414 (citing J.P. v. P.W. 772 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Collins
v. Collins, 1988 WL 30173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988) (Tomlin, J., concurring)).
93. See id.
94. Id. (quoting J.P. v. P.W. 772 S.W.2d 786, 789 (Mo. CL App. 1989)).
95. Id. at 414-15 (quoting Collins v. Collins, 1988 WL 30173, at *6 (Tenn. CL App. Mar. 30, 1988)
(Tomlin, J., concurring)).
96. See Gorham v. Gorham, 692 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Okla. 1984).
97. See Fox v. Fox, 904 P.2d 66, 69 (Okla. 1995) (citing Gorham, 692 P.2d at 1378).
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on judges' individualized conceptions of morality while focusing on direct and
adverse effects on the child.9
2. Homosexuality as a Transmittable Disease
An often considered question is whether the children of homosexual par-
ents are more likely to become gay.9 Studies have found that children raised
by homosexual parents are no more likely to grow up gay than children raised
in heterosexual households."0 Studies also show that children who grew up in
homosexual households were no more confused about their gender identities or
any more emotionally disturbed than children raised in heterosexual homes."'
Furthermore, homosexuality has long been viewed as a choice made by the les-
bian or gay parent and a learned behavior."H For example, in Collins, the Ten-
nessee appellate court in its decision relied on expert testimony that pointed to
homosexuality as a learned behavior. 3 In another Tennessee case, it was held
that "it is unacceptable to subject children to any course of conduct that might
influence them to develop homosexual traits, and the facts of this case indicate
that there is a strong possibility, because [the mother and her lesbian lover live
together], the children would be subjected to such influences.''
However, most homosexuals have heterosexual parents."5 There is also a
consensus in the scientific community that being raised by a homosexual parent
does not increase the likelihood that the child will turn out to be
homosexual." Therefore, there is likely no "inherent danger" of transmitting
homosexuality to the child if the child is raised by homosexual parents, and
such an upbringing probably will not affect the best interest of the child in a
negative manner, perceived or real.
Further implicated in this myth is that lesbian mothers are often denied
custody because there is no heterosexual role model in the household." In In
re Nicholson, a lesbian mother was denied custody because she could not pro-
vide a heterosexual role model in her household.18
98. See id.
99. See BENKOV, supra note 5, at 58; Dooley, supra note 1, at 421-22; Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1637-
38.
100. See BENKOV, supra note 5, at 62; Dooley, supra note 1, at 421 (citing B.S. Herrington, Children of
Lesbians, Developmentally Typical, PSYCHIATRIC NEws, Oct. 19, 1979, at 23; R. Green, The Best Interest of
the Child with a Lesbian Mother, BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L., Vol. 10, Nov. 1, 1982, at 7-15; Note,
Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised By Homosexual Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692 (1978)).
101. See BENKOV, supra note 5, at 62.
102. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 421.
103. See Collins v. Collins, 1988 WL 30173, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1988).
104. Dooley, supra note 1, at 421 (quoting Black v. Black, 1988 WL 22823, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar.
10, 1988)).
105. See id.
106. See id. (citing Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 985, 986 (Ohio CL App. 1987)).
107. See BENKOv, supra note 5, at 60.
108. See Hitchens & Price, supra note 5, at 456 (citing In re Nicholson, docket number unavailable be-
cause case was sealed by the court, (Iowa Dist. CL, Iowa County, Nov. 1974)).
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The Court observes that the situation in the home occupied by petitioner
[lesbian mother] and [her partner] is now the optimum which the peti-
tioner can hope to offer. This is not true in the case of respondent [hetero-
sexual father]. He may remarry and establish a home where the children
would have the attention of both a father and a step-mother. The Court
realizes that this might turn out to be a situation worse for the children
than is presently offered them. It also might be substantially better. In the
home of the respondent any changes may create either a better or a worse
environment for the children. Any changes in the home of the petitioner
and [her partner] can only be in the direction of deterioration of the pres-
ent situation.
Both would of necessity involve the employment of baby-sitters. At
the home of the petitioner the children would be in an all female environ-
ment. At the home of the respondent they will be in a male environment,
but on occasions when with the babysitter they will be in a female envi-
ronment in a heterosexual home.' 9
A heterosexual home is considered per se better than a lesbian home by many
courts."' It is often assumed, without any underlying factual support, that it is
necessary for a child's normal development to have a male and a female role
model available directly in the household."' This clearly bodes ill for our so-
ciety where "[s]ingle-parent homes comprise approximately thirty percent of
homes with children under eighteen.""' Single parent households are more
often than not predominately female households,"' with the only distinction
that they are not necessarily lesbian households. It does not necessarily follow
that there is a correlating number of children confused in their gender identity
simply because there is no heterosexual role model in their homes.
Often it is also incorrectly assumed that one of the lesbian partners acts as
the "husband" and the other as the "wife."1'4 One judge held that there was a
husband and wife relationship in a lesbian partnership because one of the wom-
en took the son to Cub Scout meetings." 5 The judge inferred that the woman
took on the role of a father."' When the witness responded that she filled the
role of an aunt or a grandmother, the judge responded, "Oh, come on now, you
and I both know what's going on.""' 7 Here, the judge seems to have imposed
his own values and morals on a case without any underlying factual support.
However, California courts have held that a judge's opinion regarding the
109. Id. (quoting In re Nicholson, docket number unavailable because case was sealed by the court, (Iowa
Dist. Ct., Iowa County, Nov. 1974)).
110. See BENKOv, supra note 5, at 60.
111. See id. at 61.
112. Joyce McConnell, Standby Guardianship: Sharing the Legal Responsibility for Children, 7 MD. J.
COmttMP. LEGAL ISsUES 249, 255 (1996) (footnote omitted).
113. See id. at 256.
114. See Hitchens & Price, supra note 5, at 458.
115. See id. at 458 (citing In re Mathews, docket number unavailable because case was sealed by the
court, (Cal. Super. CL, Santa Clara County, 1975)).
116. See id. (citing In re Mathews, docket number unavailable because case was sealed by the court, (Cal.
Super. CL, Santa Clam County, 1975)).
117. See id. (citing In re Mathews, docket number unavailable because case was sealed by the court, (Cal.
Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, 1975)).
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parent's moral and personal characteristics and a judge's offended sensibilities
should not enter into custody decisions when there is no apparent connection of
harm to the children."' "The judge's view of the child's moral well-being
may not be the same as the child's best interest.""' 9
Ultimately, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Fox did not address the issue
of homosexuality as a "contagious disease." By ignoring this issue, it wisely
omitted another myth that has no direct and adverse effect on the children. The
court based its decision solely on the best interest of the child, as established by
factors that are actually and directly adverse to the children."'
3. Stigma and Social Condemnation
Another factor the courts consider is whether the stigma attached to the
homosexual relationship of their parents will result in future harm to the chil-
dren.' It is usually the possible future harm with which the courts and ex-
perts on children's issues are concerned. In one California case, an expert psy-
chologist testified that the children should be removed from their mother's
custody because of a "definite possibility" that the children may experience
derision in the future." But studies on the issue of stigmatization have shown
that there is much less actual stigmatization than feared by the courts"u and
there is rarely any evidentiary support of harassment of children. 4
In Palmore v. Sidoti,I5 the United States Supreme Court held that even
when a risk of societal stigmatization exists, private biases and possible future
harm should not override the rights of the natural mother for custody."l The
Court stated: "The question, however, is whether the reality of private biases
and the possible injury they might inflict are permissible considerations for
removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother. We have little
difficulty concluding that they are not."'2 7 Also, in 1974, the Ohio Supreme
Court approved the adoption of an African American child by a Caucasian
petitioner, holding that it could not deny custody based on a belief that the
child might be stigmatized by societal prejudice."
118. See id. at 459 (citing Clarke v. Clarke, 217 P.2d 401 (Cal. 1950); Stack v. Stack, 11 Cal. Rptr. 177
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961); In re Marriage of Ciganovich, 132 Cal. Rptr. 261 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1976)).
119. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1639.
120. See Fox v. Fox, 904 P.2d 66, 69 (Okla. 1995).
121. See generally BENKOV, supra note 5, at 63-67.
122. See Hitchens, supra note 1, at 90 (citing Reporter's Transcript at 38, Smith v. Smith, Civ. No.
125497 (Cal. Super. Ct., Stanislaus County, 1978)).
123. See BENKOV, supra note 5, at 64; Hitchens & Price, supra note 5, at 468.
124. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1638; Hitchens & Price, supra note 5, at 468-69. Apparently there is
only one reported case involving actual evidence of harassment. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1638 (citing L.
v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 244 (Mo. CL App. 1982) (referring to evidence that the children were teased about the
lesbian mother's lifestyle while in the custody of the heterosexual father)).
125. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
126. See id. at 433.
127. Id. (emphasis added).




Eichinger-Swainston: Fox v. Fox: Redefining the Best Interest of the Child Standard fo
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1996
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
These cases are analogous to child custody situations involving lesbian
mothers. 9 As in M.J.P.,30 the argument in such cases is often that the soci-
etal prejudice against lesbian mothers will result in future harm to the child.
Just as the United States Supreme Court held this reasoning unconstitutional for
interracial situations,' this reasoning must also be held unconstitutional for
societal prejudice against lesbian mothers. Accordingly, in an Alaska Su-
preme Court decision, the court held that "it is impermissible to rely on any
real or imagined social stigma attaching to [the] mother's status as a lesbi-
an."',3 3 The Oklahoma Supreme Court agrees with this reasoning as evidenced
by the Miracle decision which held that possible future psychological harm to
children should not be considered by courts in making custody determina-
tions."M
Additionally, the effect of social stigmatization may easily be buffered by
a supportive and loving home.1 35 Children will inevitably learn that discrimi-
nation exists in a not-so-perfect world, and they can be taught to deal with the
experience of discrimination in a constructive way.' 36 A New Jersey appellate
court denied a motion for custody modification after determining that modifying
custody would not eliminate the potential source of embarrassment and stigma-
tization caused by the parent's sexual orientation.'37 The court also noted that
children in the custody of a gay parent might benefit from learning to deal with
and overcome prejudice.'38 Similarly, an Ohio appellate court used the same
reasoning when denying a modification of custody because of the father's ho-
mosexuality.'39 These cases establish that the potential for future harm to the
child because of prejudice and stigmatization should not be a factor in deter-
mining a homosexual parent's custody rights."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Fox firmly rejected the Court of
Appeals' interpretation of MJ.P., that custody could be changed based on po-
tential future harm because of stigmatization due to the mother's lesbianism. 4'
The Fox court instead noted that the M.J.P. decision was based on the presence
of sufficient evidence to change custody which did not exist in Fox.'42
129. See id. (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Portage County Welfare Dep't v. Summers,
311 N.E.2d 6 (Ohio 1974)).
130. See MJ.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 969 (Okla. 1982).
131. See Palmre, 466 U.S. at 433.
132. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 418.
133. Id. (quoting S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 876, 879 (Alaska 1985)).
134. See Miracle v. Miracle, 360 P.2d 712, 715 (Okla. 1961).
135. See BENKOV, supra note 5, at 64.
136. See id.
137. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 418 (citing M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1261 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1979)).
138. See id. (citing M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256, 1261 (NJ. Super. CL App. Div. 1979)).
139. See id. at 418-19 (citing Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 985, 987 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987)).
140. See id. at 419.
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4. Molestation by Gay Parents
One of the most enduring myths concerning homosexuals is that they are
more likely to molest children than heterosexuals. 43 This perception stems
partly from the view that homosexuality is a sickness.'" However, empirical
data has shown that most child molestation is committed by heterosexual
males. 45 Accordingly, it is statistically far less likely that Donna Fox or her
lover would put the children at risk for molestation than would Larry Fox. The
myth connecting homosexuality and pedophilia not only puts another unnec-
essary burden on lesbian mothers, but it also obscures one of the darker sides of
heterosexuality.'" The court in Fox made no reference to the danger of child
molestation by Donna Fox. This should be a future guideline for Oklahoma
courts not to entertain unfounded claims of molestation dangers based solely on
the mother's sexual orientation.
5. Lesbianism and Sodomy As Crime
Another often articulated argument against granting custody to a homosex-
ual parent maintains that it is psychologically detrimental for a child to be
raised by a parent engaged in criminal acts, most notably sodomy.47 Sodomy
statute arguments track the general moral and religious condemnation of homo-
sexuality by judges.'" "Homosexuality has been considered contrary to the
morality of man for well over two thousand years. It has been and is considered
to be an unnatural, immoral act."'49 The Oklahoma Sodomy Statute holds sod-
omy to be a "detestable and abominable crime against nature" punishable by
imprisonment.'
The American Heritage Dictionary defines sodomy as: (1) "anal copulation
of one male with another," (2) "anal or oral copulation with a member of the
opposite sex," or (3) "copulation with an animal.'' It is questionable accord-
ing to this definition whether lesbian sexual acts are even proscribed at all
under sodomy statutes. The dictionary definition only refers to male/male and
heterosexual sexual practices, and sodomy statutes do not generally declare
143. See BENKOV, supra note 5, at 68; Hitchens, supra note 1, at 94.
144. See generally BENKOV, supra note 5, at 52-57.
145. See id. at 68; Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1640 n.81 (citing R. GEISER, I-DDEN VICTIMs: THE SEXUAL
ABUSE OF CHILDREN 75 (1979); Fredrick W. Bozett, Children of Gay Fathers, in GAY AND LESBIAN PAR-
ENTS 47 (Fredrick W. Bozett ed., 1987)); Marilyn Riley, The Avowed Lesbian Mother and Her Right to Child
Custody: A Constitutional Challenge That Can No Longer Be Denied, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 799, 860
(1975).
146. See BENKOV, supra note 5, at 68.
147. See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 107 (Va. 1995); Dooley, supra note 1, at 419-421;
Sullivan, supra note 1, at 1640. See generally BENKOV, supra note 5, at 48-52.
148. See BENKOV, supra note 5, at 48.
149. Dooley, supra note 1, at 414-15 (citing Collins v. Collins, 1988 WL 30173 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 30,
1989) (Tomlin, J., concurring)).
150. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (Supp. 1995) (entitled "Crimes Against Nature").
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homosexuality illegal per se.' "Since fewer than half the states still have
sodomy statutes, and since most sodomy statutes do not prohibit" many homo-
sexual and lesbian sex practices, most lesbians "are not engaging in criminal
behavior" according to the language in the sodomy statutes.1
3
Further, the act of sodomy is illegal "whether performed by heterosexual
or homosexual couples."'5 4 When sodomy statutes are discussed in court opin-
ions, sodomy is equated to homosexuality and courts rarely inquire whether
actual sodomy took place. 55 Moreover, inquiry into sodomy statutes is gener-
ally only made when homosexual parents are involved in custody disputes." 6
Courts do not routinely question heterosexual parents about whether they en-
gage in sodomy. 7 Such questioning directed toward homosexuals seems arbi-
trary since some homosexuals, and in particular lesbians, do not engage in
sodomy practices, and some heterosexuals do.' 8
Because sodomy statutes are in decline, courts should not apply the sod-
omy statute selectively to the lesbian mother. As the law applies to heterosexu-
als and homosexuals alike,"5 9 the sexual practices of the heterosexual parent
would have to be questioned as well. Although Oklahoma still has a sodomy
statute, the courts in Oklahoma may consider the nationwide trend to abolish
those statutes which do nothing more than legislate morality. Legislating con-
cepts of morality, in clear conflict with rational considerations and empirical
evidence, is an archaic practice.
It is also questionable whether there is a direct relation between the
parent's illegal sodomy practices and the best interest of the child."6 The nex-
us standard would require the court to find that negative effects on the child
were caused by the parent's sexual practices. 6' Judges and lawyers often try
to insinuate that homosexuals have sex in front of their children.' However,
most parents, heterosexual or homosexual, engage in sexual acts in privacy and
not in view of their children. Therefore, the effect of homosexual sexual acts on
the child should generally be nonexistent.
Sodomy statutes are archaic statutes that have little or no application to the
realities of lesbian sexuality and the effect on their children and should not be
considered in lesbian custody cases. 63 Even though Oklahoma has a sodomy
statute,"6 the Oklahoma Supreme Court made no mention of it in Fox. This
152. See BENKov, supra note 5, at 51.
153. Dooley, supra note 1, at 419-20.




158. See id; Dooley, supra note 1, at 419-20.
159. See BENKOV, supra note 5, at 51.
160. See Dooley, supra note 1, at 420-21.
161. See id.
162. See Hitehens, supra note 1, at 94.
163. But see Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 107 (Va. 1995) (emphasizing that sodomy is a felony
and applying the sodomy statute to the case).
164. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 886 (Supp. 1995).
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omission is in harmony with the court's focus on the best interest of the child
and the nexus standard. The court made a prudent decision to disregard archaic
and unapplicable precepts under the sodomy statutes.
C. Was Fox a Good Decision in Light of the Factors Affecting the Psycho-
logical Well-Being of the Child?
Empirical studies, scientific data, and logical reasoning have disproved
common myths about homosexual parents. Children raised by homosexual par-
ents are not significantly more likely to suffer harm than children raised by
heterosexual parents. Although there is a greater chance of stigmatization for
children living in a lesbian household than for children in a heterosexual house-
hold,65 the possible psychological effects are not as extensive as often feared
by the courts."6
The courts should focus on the actual facts in each case rather than using
these myths to deny lesbian mothers custody. Clearly, to determine what is in
the best interest of the child, the court must consider overall parental capabili-
ties to provide for the child's emotional, physical, and mental welfare. Accord-
ingly, evaluating each case under the nexus standard, as applied in Fox by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, is the only viable alternative.167 It is often detri-
mental to the child, rather than in the best interest of the child, when judges
make child custody decisions based on individual conceptions of morality. 6 '
VIII. IMPLICATIONS
The Oklahoma Supreme Court did not pass judgement on or approve of
homosexuality. The court did not impose its own values and morals, but simply
made a rational and well-reasoned decision as to what was in the best interest
of the children involved. Consequently, the court made no value judgement on
whether homosexuality is "right or wrong." Since the court's reasoning focused
only on actual adverse factors, there may be positive implications for possible
adoptions by lesbians and gays. If a parent's homosexuality does not negatively
affect the child's best interest, there seems to be no logical reason why other-
wise qualified homosexuals should not be allowed to adopt children just like
their heterosexual counterparts. New York's highest court held that unmarried
couples in New York, including homosexuals, may adopt the children of their
partners. 69 The highest courts in Massachusetts, Vermont, and the District of
Columbia have also made similar findings.7 '
165. See generally BHNKOV, supra note 5, at 63-64.
166. See id. at 64.
167. See id. (suggesting determinations of custody be made on a case-by-case basis).
168. See Gorham v. Gorham, 692 P.2d 1375, 1378 (Okla. 1984).
169. See In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398 (N.Y. 1995). Chief Judge Judith Kaye stated that to deny the
second non-marital parent adoption rights "would mean that thousands of New York children actually being
raised in homes headed by two unmarried persons could only have one legal parent, not the two who want
them." Id. See also Naionline, USA TODAY, Nov. 3, 1995, at 3A.
170. See In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993); In re
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There may be upcoming criticism that the court in Fox endorsed homosex-
uality. The court, however, actually refused to bring in its own conceptions of
morality and ruled solely on the factors that objectively affect the best interest
of the child. The court tried to leave out the unanswerable query of whose
morals and values apply. Nonetheless, the question remains whether the court
should consider values as part of the education and upbringing of children.
Most recent cases have implied that questions of morality are either private
issues or, at best, issues for the legislature because they involve policy deci-
sions. Therefore, courts should not interfere in those issues.
Since the court refused to legislate morality in this case, the Fox decision,
perhaps more remotely, implicates other issues. Gay marriages currently are not
allowed in any state of the nation. 7' If there are enough logical and reasoned
factors supporting gay marriages, should the courts not allow them absent any
considerations of morality? Moreover, sodomy statutes largely legislate morality
and should perhaps be reconsidered without moral evaluation. It would seem
consistent by implication that, after the decision in Fox, there is a need to re-
consider the applicability and utility of the Oklahoma sodomy statute.
IX. CONCLUSION
In Fox v. Fox, the Oklahoma Supreme Court clearly established that in
custody cases, including those where the mother is a lesbian, the "nexus stan-
dard" should be applied. The court followed a trend in many jurisdictions to
view the homosexuality of a parent not as a determinative factor, but instead
electing to focus on direct and adverse factors affecting the best interest of the
child. Using a parent's sexual preference as the sole and ruling determinant to
deny custody rights violates the statutory requirement of basing the decision on
the best interest of the child. The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Fox made a
well-reasoned decision and the only decision that is acceptable in view of the
best interest of the child standard.
Katja M. Eichinger-Swainston
M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. 1995). See also Nationline, USA TODAY, Nov. 3, 1995, at 3A.
171. The Hawaii Supreme Court case of Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), held that a statute
restricting marriage to the union of a man and woman to be a sex-based classification which would be subject
to strict scrutiny in an equal protection challenge. In response, the United States Congress enacted the Defense
of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), defining marriage as a union between one man
and one woman. Id. at § 3 (to be codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7). The Act also allows states not to give effect to
same-sex marriages created in other states. Id. at § 2 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).
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